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Mariana Pimentel Fischer Pacheco, Recife / Brazil* 
 
On the Excessive Role of Technocracy (from a Gadamerian Perspective) 
 
Abstract: The role of experts grows in the present and that is, in part, justifiable: as complexity rises, the 
ones who deliberate feel the need of the help of those who have know-how in specific fields.  The question 
that must be asked revolves around the type of expectations developed in modern societies regarding 
what experts can do. Though specialization is not a peculiarity of our time (the process can be observed 
since human beings became sedentary); it has presently gained specific characteristics. Two aspects of 
modern life are particularly significant on that matter:  (i.) the fact that the economic system is based on 
excitation of new needs (and no longer on the demand for satisfaction of needs); (ii.) the growing pursuit 
for total administration of conflicts. These factors are constitutive of what Gadamer sees as a great threat 
to our civilization: the excessive emphasis given in our time to the human ability to adapt. A specific 
ability is demanded from individuals: the capability of making an apparatus functions properly. Less 
resistance and more adaptability is requested, and because of that, autonomous thought - that is, not 
determined by the function it has in a system – is devalued. The threat we currently face is that the 
abilities of a good technocrat become the only qualities demanded from those who are responsible for 
practical  decisions  (especially  in  politics  and  law).  Teleological  reason,  that  guides  the  activity  of 
specialists  (and  requires  know-how  in  a  specific  area  and  consists  in  choosing  means  to  reach  a 
previously established goal), should not substitute practical reason, as the former requires adaptability to 
experience (not to a plan that was previously established) and is grounded on solidarity. In order to 
discuss the limits of the activity of specialists, the paper looks back to phrónesis and the way ancient 
Greeks set boundaries - this exercise should help raising new questions revolving the matter. 
Keywords: hermeneutics, technology, experience, phrónesis 
 
I. Introduction: are our expectations about what specialists can do realistic? 
The question this paper intends to ask revolves around the role of technocracy in our time. The 
hypothesis raised is that limits to technology have not been properly established.  
In order to make general decisions about what we, as a community, want to be in the future 
and more specific choices about how do we want our judiciary system to work, it is important 
not to forget the limits of teleological rationality, that guides the decisions of specialists – as 
Kant has taught us
1.    
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1 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Herança e futuro da Europa, 1998.  2 
The  relevance  of  specialists  grows  today  in  almost  every  area,  including  in  fields  like 
politics and law. That is, in part, justifiable: as complexity rises, the ones who deliberate feel the 
need of the help of those who have know-how in specific domains. There are, however, reasons 
to be concerned when people start to believe that the abilities of a good specialist should become 
the only qualities requested of those who are responsible for practical decisions.  
Hans-Georg Gadamer clarifies the differences between the activity of specialists - who have 
know-how  in  specific  fields  and  are  able  to  choose  efficient  means  to  reach  a  previously 
established goal - and the activity of the ones who are responsible for practical decisions - that 
requires adaptability to experience and has a lot to do with solidarity. According to Gadamer, the 
unrealistic expectations developed in modern societies in regards to what experts can do makes it 
difficult for us to learn where to draw the line between both domains. 
Confusion about boundaries is a crucial underlying issue in the current Brazilian debate 
about reforms in the judiciary power. The discussions are centered on management strategies to 
gain efficiency: the main goal is to have fast and predictable decisions. The lack of concern of 
the players about the quality of decisions and the decision making process are consequences of 
the  aforementioned  confusion  (one  can  observe  claims  for  public  and  more  reasonable 
justification of decision coming from Brazilian academic circles
2, but these demands do not 
seem to be yet strong enough to change the direction of the debate).
  
It is, hence, relevant to ask in what ways those powerful claims for efficiency - for fast and 
predictable  decisions  -  obfuscate  the  importance  of  defining  a  domain  for  the  exercise  of 
practical reason.  In order to decide if what we want is to continuing using the current approach, 
it is crucial to understand what is it that we may have to leave behind in order to gain more 
rapidity and predictability.  
Gadamer writes that the word ethos for ancient Greeks refer to mode of living. It points out 
to the fact that we are all participant of a historic situation and in order to make good decisions 
we must pay attention to our position and to concrete events.   
The  ethical  aspects  of  the  decision  making  process  are  not  being  sufficiently  discussed 
nowadays; it is, hence, relevant to look back to the past in order to start a serious conversation 
about the matter. We should be reminded what Aristotle wrote about phrónesis.  
The  effort  to  understand  what  phrónesis  was  is  not  driven  by  any  kind  of  nostalgic 
obsession
3 and it is not related to the aim of transporting practices that were part of an ancient 
                                                           
2 José Rodrigo Rodriguez, Sobre a qualidade da jurisdição: justiça opinativa e luta pela justificação no direito 
brasileiro contemporâneo, 2011.  
3 Richard Rorty writes that Heideggers attempt to return to ancient Greeks is impregnated of nostalgic 
fundationalism. See Richard Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and others, 1991. 3 
mode of life to the present. Reminding what phrónesis was may help us to make better decisions 
about what do we want our judiciary to be. There are important questions to ask and we should 
be open to them.  
The task ahead can be now more clearly defined. In order to illustrate and construct a more 
consistent debate about the limits of teleological reason, this paper will use examples that are 
related to Brazilian judiciary reforms. It intends to compare the way we think about the decision 
making process nowadays with the way the ancient Greeks thought of it (this exercise must help 
us raising new questions about the issue). The decision to look at ancient Greek in particular lays 
on the interest of discussing the boundaries that in the past defined the domain of practical 
reason in a more clear way. 
It´s  also  important  to  stress  that  this  work  does  not  dwell  on  the  discussion  about 
justification of decisions (whether if it should include moral arguments or be restricted to legal 
ones); it focus on the decision making process. It asks what should be part of the process within 
which judge comes to a decision and what can be excluded of it in order to gain more efficiency 
and rapidity. A particularly interesting issue refers to the fact that the request for oral procedures 
is  being  progressively  devalued  by  brazilian  judges
4. The problem has specific aggravating 
features in fields like family law. We must start questioning, for instance, if does it make sense 
for a judge to make a decision about custody of a child without the litigants, nor the child, ever 
meeting de judge. 
The first section of the paper explores the role of specialists nowadays and brings out 
Gadamer’s concerns about the excessive emphasis given in our times to the human capacity to 
adapt to an “apparatus”. The second section brings out Aristotle’s definition of phrónesis and 
clarifies that ethical decisions, in the past, were made through a praxis in which adaptability to 
experience  was  required.  The  following  section  dwells  on  Gadamer´s  considerations  about 
formation (Bildung) and its connections with phrónesis (which, as Aristotle wrote, cannot be 
taught). The philologist revisits the hegelian concept and redefines formation (Bildung) as the 
process in which one can acquire the potency of being open to experiences. The last section aims 
to discuss the assumptions that have been driving the Brazilian debate about reforms on the 
judiciary power and raise some new questions considering what was previously discussed. 
 
   
                                                           
4 That is the conclusion of a field research made in Judicial Courts of Rio de Janeiro in 2006. See Bárbara Gomes 
Lupetti Babtista, Oralidade Processual e Construção da Verdade Jurídica,  In: Revistas da SJRJ,  2008, 131-160. 4 
II. About the excessive emphasis given in modern societies to the human ability to adapt to 
an “apparatus” 
Specialization is a trend of socialization that can be observed since human beings started to live 
in sedentary communities. In the past there were pastors, hunters, artificers, as today there are 
specialized scientists; in all the cases, specialists exercise domain on a specific area.   
Though specialization is not a peculiarity of our time; it has gained specific characteristics 
nowadays. Two aspects of modern life are particularly significant on the matter:  (i.) the fact that 
the economic system is based on excitation of new needs (and no longer on the demand for 
satisfaction of needs)
5; (ii.) the growing pursuit for total administration of conflicts.  The work 
performed by specialists must be understood considering the function of science in a context o f 
excitation of consumption (which generated tremendous pressure on producer and specialists) 
and of growing influence of social engineer in areas that were before guided by a different kind 
of  reasoning  (Zeljko  Loparic  observes  that  widespread  optimistic  believe  in  what  social 
engineering can accomplish has to be comprehended in connection with the moral skepticism of 
our time
6).  It is crucial to stress that so called “scientifically proven facts” are not immune to 
pressure  and  they  gain  its  importance  and  meaning  from  argumentative  contexts,  which  are 
determined by interests and expectations. 
This  situation  constitutes  what  Gadamer  sees  as  a  great  threat  to  our  civilization:  the 
excessive emphasis  given nowadays  to  the human capacity to  adapt.  What  is  required from 
workers is the specific ability to make an apparatus function properly
7 .  Less resistance and 
more adaptability is requested, and because of that, autonomous thought – that is, not determined 
by the function it has in a system – is devalued. The greater is the pressure for adaptability, the 
closer we get to what Gadamer calls “society of functionaries”. The threat we currently face is 
that the abilities of a specialist become the main (or the only) qualities expected of those who 
make decisions in fields like politics and law.  
Gadamer remind us that Plato wrote that the ones who need what is produced have the 
function  of  specifying  the  product  and  the  ones  who  fabricate  it  are  subordinated  to  that 
specification
8. Behind that statement lays one thesis: economical reason should be subordinated 
to practical reason (nevertheless, we should not forget that permanent struggles for power 
characterizes the factual interaction between both spheres and that, in our time, economic 
systems, based on excitation of consumption, have gain power over political systems).  
                                                           
5Hans-Georg Gadamer, Herança e futuro da Europa, 1998. 
6Zejljco Loparic, Ética e Finitude, 2004.  
7  Hans-Georg Gadamer, Razão na época da ciência, 1983.  
8Hans-Georg Gadamer, Herança e futuro da Europa, 1998. 5 
Making technical and specialized decisions is different than making ethical ones. Unlike the 
former - that is guide for teleological reason-, the latest task brings out two types of rationality 
(which are part of a single process): one of them guides the discovery of adequate means to an 
end and the other kind of rationality is suitable for choosing ends. 
In modern societies there are, doubtlessly, multiples perspectives and conflicted normative 
claims;  this  fact  should  not,  however,  become  an  excuse  to  give  up  on  making  efforts  to 
construct rational justification for decisions about ends. Practical reason must guide our actions 
and the convenience of the means used as we act; hence, one should take seriously questions like 
“what is a good life?” and “what are the Just means to it?” 
9  
An expert is someone to consult and who can help to make decisions about ethical issues, 
but should not substitute the ones who are responsible for making it. We can make a good use of 
science, technology and teleological rationality if we are aware of its limits. The problem is that 
today we seem to forget those boundaries. We have not been paying much attention on the habits 
we have developed in an environment of excessive technocracy. We have learned to manipulate 
time (as it was an object “at-hand”) in order to use it to bring the maximal utility and we have 
forgotten  the  importance  of  “letting  experiences  take  its  time”.  When  we  give  time  to 
experiences, we allow them to show themselves in their own unique way – we let them affect us, 
aesthetically. The anxious and goal-oriented way that we deal with things is stealing the time 
necessary for  an experience to  affect.  In that mode we do not  allow the negative aspect  of 
experiences (their potential to deny our plans) to show itself. 
   
III. Aristotle’s phrónesis and the relevance of adaptability to cases (and experiences) in the 
decision making process.  
The current debate about judiciary reforms in Brazil is, doubtlessly, connected to those claims 
for social engineering and control of decisions. In that context, demands for elaborating laws 
with  accurate  and  closed  meaning  (José  Rodrigo  Rodriguez  clarifies  that  this  kind  of  claim 
comes from those who defend “textualismo”
10), for standardization of decisions and for a fast an 
almost mechanical decision making process grows stronger.  
The question to be asked is what may be left behind if the activity of judges became more 
and more similar to the activity of making specialized technical decisions?  
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We can decide to make reforms that go in that direction, but there are also other options - 
that  shouldn´t  be  forgotten.  Reminding  what  Aristotle  wrote  about  phrónesis  can  bring  out 
possibilities that currently are not getting enough attention.  
Aristotle clarified the differences between episteme, techné e phrónesis. The first concept 
refers to theoretical knowledge and is related to the search of universals. The second notion 
points to know-how in making certain products - like in art or craftwork. Phrónesis is practical 
wisdom; it is moral deliberation within life´s contingences.  Its aim is to apply (Gadamer writes 
that comprehension, interpretation and application are inseparable) general norms to a particular 
cases. Phrónesis is different from techné because a human being should not relate other human 
being in the same way that a craftsman deals with the material he uses to make products.
11 
When a craftsman uses a  techné he has right in the beginning the image of the object he 
wants to create. The material he uses is a fungible mean to build what was projected. In the other 
hand, when it comes to ethical decisions, an image or concept are not sufficient to define the 
outcome of the process (an idea should not undermine a concrete problem).  Ideas like justice, 
solidarity  and  common  good  are,  certainly,  directives,  but  they  need  to  be  adapted  to  the 
circumstances. Phrónesis doesn’t allow us to extract aspects of concrete situation (abstraction) in 
order to use them to reach a previously established plan.  
When a craftsman does not find the material he wishes to use for his work, he can renounce 
the  project  he  first  had  in  mind  and  adapt.  But  that  is  not  a  specific  requirement  of  his 
occupation; that is a problem for him: the imperfection of the means will probably make the 
craftsman feel frustrated.  
Adapt  general  laws  to  concrete  cases  is,  on  the  other  hand,  a  requirement  for  making 
practical decisions. In this domain, adaptation is not a concession made for us to deal with a 
practical problem: it is a matter of morality.
12  
Unlike techné, there is not a specific and previously establish end in phrónesis. There is a 
general care for life and the claim that ends are not to be thought of as an object of use. Taking 
responsibility for making good decisions is not the same as manufacturing an object. One can 
only learn phrónesis through life experience. Accumulating information or developing a specific 
ability is not enough: what should be pursued is a deeper wisdom about life and human relations. 
Gadamer  writes  that  the  Greek  word  ethos  refers  to  mode  of  living.  It  points  out  to 
convictions and habits. Taking ethics seriously is paying attention to concrete events the way 
they present themselves. Phrónesis is rooted morality: it brings out the aesthetical aspects of 
experience as it lets experiences affect in an integral way. 
                                                           
11 Hans-Georg Gadamer. Verdade e Método I - Traços Fundamentais de uma Hermenêutica Filosófica, 2002.  
12 Hans-Georg Gadamer. Verdade e Método I - Traços Fundamentais de uma Hermenêutica Filosófica, 2002.  7 
Modern technical training pressures human beings to become more and more insensitive to 
experiences: it is training for repeating standardized answers. Openness to the aesthetical aspects 
of every experience is an effort to bring up sensitivity to the surprising aspects of concrete events 
and to allow the emergence of new forms of dealing with things.  
Gadamer writes that a human being who is open to experiences does not know and doesn’t 
judge based in an external non-affected position
13, but rather as being part of something that 
brings him and other person together in a way that one is affected by the very presence of the 
other and can learn to “put himself in the other person's shoes”.  
Gadamerians ethics refers to factual relations and lived solidarity, which is in the root of the 
formation of a community and of all ethical decisions made within it. Practical decisions are 
connected  with  comprehending  in  an  empathic  way,  like  in  a  conversation  with  a  friend. 
According to Gadamer conversation is the paradigmatic form of communication: it happens in a 
concrete situation where another person is  physically present, a spoken language is used and the 
situation favors emotional connections. The relevance of conversation and its potential to affect 
(that  is,  its aesthetical  aspects) raises once more the aforementioned issue about  reforms  on 
judiciary power: are we willing to leave behind the conversational (or oral) phases of the judicial 
process? The issue will be better explore in the concluding section. 
 
III.  Phrónesis  and  Formation  (Bildung):    acquiring  the  potency  of  being  open  to 
experiences 
Aristotle wrote that, unlike techné or episteme, phrónesis cannot be taught; it’s rather something 
that can be gained through life and openness to experience. 
The  German  word  Bildung  is  frequently  translated  as  formation  or  education. 
Bildungprozess  is  a  personal  or  social  ongoing  process  towards  growing  or  developing
14. 
Formation, in this sense, is not search for actualization of a previously elaborated  plan; it is a 
dynamic within which one can learn.    
Gadamer writes that the word  Bildung originally comes from the middle age, but it was 
Hegel who had defined it in a more precise way. The philologist uses Hegel’s concept as a 
starting point, but, in the end, reaches a very different conception of Bildung.  
Formation (Bidung), for Hegel, refers to a progressive movement from the immediate and 
particular  to  universals.  Until  this  point  there  is  no  disagreement,  since  according  to 
philosophical hermeneutics only because we are linguistic beings we can distance ourselves from 
                                                           
13Hans-Georg Gadamer, Verdade e Método II – Complementos e Índice, 2002.  
14Jerald Wallullis. The Hermeneutics of Life History – Personal Achievemente and History in Gadamer, Habermas 
and Erikson, 1990.  8 
what is immediate and became able to make present what is universal. The question that is at the 
core of the debate is: what is the meaning of universality for hermeneutists and for German 
idealism?  
Universality for Hegel’s idealism is connected to absolute knowledge, capable of making 
history transparency (that is, conceptual). The word gains a very different meaning in Gadamer´s 
perspective: because language makes present what is universal, it can bring out our end, our 
mortality (the idea that one of the main characteristics that define us as human beings is our 
capacity to anticipate death is not important only to hermeneutists, many anthropologists also 
emphasize  features  of  funeral  rituals  that,  since  very  early  ages,  shows  peculiarities  of  our 
species).
15 
Gadamer reverses the direction of the trajectory of Hegel´s thought: the new route goes 
from the absolute spirit to the substantiality of tradition
16. Consciousness is finite, what happens 
historically always exceed what we are able to grasp and the aspects of experience that are 
concretely there but cannot be apprehended by our modern way of thinking should not be 
neglected (the relevance and the role   of  the  rest  or  of  what  cannot  be  apprehend  by  our 
consciousness is in the core of the distinction between the approaches).  
Understanding the different meanings of experience in both perspectives can clarify the 
issue at stake.  
Hegel emphasizes the result of an experience;  that is, the knowledge that one can gain 
thought it. Experiences can lead to self-knowledge that, at end, will have no longer an object
17: 
the result of an experience is knowledge, at its highest point, absolute knowledge. That is why, 
for Hegel, dialectics of experience reaches its finality when it overcomes all experiences. 
Gadamer observes that Hegels idealism is impregnated with a lack of solicitude towards 
experience. According to the philologist, infinity is the flux of experiences  – not the knowledge 
acquired through it. Gadamer emphasizes the process of having experiences and not the result of 
it: with a proper formation (Bildung) one can learn to let an experience affect.  
The meaning of experience for Gadamer is, of course, also different from the way positivists 
understand it
18: positivists forget that the instant of an experience is not a fragment that can be 
separated from its historical meaning.
19Experience is history acting in the present. Because 
                                                           
15 MORIN, Edgar Morin . O Homem e a Morte, 1997 e Hans-Georg Gadamer Herança e Futuro da Europa,  1998. 
16Jerald Wallulis. The Hermeneutics of Life History – Personal Achievemente and History in Gadamer, Habermas 
and Erikson, 1990. 
17Hans-Georg Gadamer, La Dialética de Hegel – Cinco Ensayos Hermenêuticos, 1994.  
18Cristian Delecampagne. História da filosofia no século XX, 1997. 
19Martin Heidegger, Lógica. La Pregunta por la Verdad. Madrid, 2004.  9 
experiences always resist to be apprehended in a concept, they frustrate. Openness to experiences 
can, hence, reveal that our consciousness is limited and finite.  
Experienced  human  beings  are  not  the  ones  who  developed  some  kind  of  ability  or 
knowledge in a specific field, but human beings who have learned to deal with the uncertainty of 
predictions and the limits of planning. Formation (Bildung) is the process of obtaining something 
that was already potentially there: an open attitude towards experiences.  What was achieved 
cannot be separated of the process of achieving it.
20 When a formation is achieved what has 
happened in the process doesn´t go away, what was overcame doesn’t stay in the past.  
The meaning of overcoming brings out another point of divergence between hermeneutics 
and  idealism.  For  Hegel,  reaching  an  idea  is  overcoming  or  leaving  behind  what  was  there 
before. According to Gadamer, what is there concretely is always conflicted; when we distance 
ourselves from it we are also driving ourselves away from is true (that is, from what happens in a 
concrete event). For instance, overcoming a lost (maybe of someone loved) is not forgetting 
what has been lost. Grieving does not lead to extinction of pain, but acceptance and elaboration 
of a mode of carrying the pain. Suffering always leave marks, we can learn a better way to deal 
with it when we accept it as part of our lives. The painful experiences are there, but modified, 
resignified; they still a part of our lives even when we have overcame it.  
Gianni Vattimo explains that the word Verwindung was used by Heidegger in “Identity and 
Difference” in the context of the discussion about overcoming metaphysics and it refer to a 
movement  of  passing  through  something  with  deep  acceptance.    Verwindung  points  to 
convalescence (as in recovering from a disease or grieving from a lost) and a twist. Metaphysics 
is not something that can be left behind, its vestiges stay. We can deal with metaphysics in a 
better way if we get closer and dwell in it: that’s the way to twist the direction and to find other 
possibilities of orientation.
21 
Formation (Bildung) is the process within which we gain conscience that we are a part of a 
historical dynamics. Openness to its movement is a way to deal better with life. An open attitude 
is a potency achieved: an open human being knows that we can learn from tradition and also that 
we need to have a humble attitude to be able to really learn something. One can learn with 
experiences when pays attention to what it is and do not forget that it is always more than what 
can be apprehended by our conscience.  
                                                           
20Jerald Wallulis, The hermeneutics of life history – personal achievemente and history in Gadamer, Habermas and 
Erikson,1990.  
21 Gianni Vattimo, O Fim da Modernidade – Niilismo e Hermenêutica na Cultura Pós-Moderna, 2002.  About 
Verwindung also see Martin Heidegger, Que é isto – A Filosofia? / Identidade e Diferença, 2006. 10 
It is also possible to spend life paying too much attention to abstract concepts and projects 
and have the action determined by goal-oriented thinking. Orienting life by planning is a way to 
avoid contingence and frustration. In order to gain an ethical wisdom it is necessary to let oneself 
be formed (Bildung) by concrete and unpredictable experiences.
22 
 
IV. When the pressure for efficiency and rapidity is  excessive? The example  of justice 
courts from Rio de Janeiro (can judges  make good decisions without ever  meeting  the 
litigants?)  
As it was pointed before, this paper does not intend to look at the way the decision making 
process was on the past for nostalgic reasons. It does not assume that the best solutions for the 
issues that the judiciary Power faces today must be transplanted from ancient Greek.  
This  paper  is  about  openness  to  new  questions  and  finding  new  possibilities  through 
historical awareness. We should look at the past to gain conscience that the problems we face 
today are historical and that the answers are connected with what we see as relevant solution in 
our time. Paying more attention to aspects of the decision making process that have lost its force 
in time may help us to make better choices about what we are really ready to leave behind. 
Reforms on the judiciary system should, of course, be made with the help of science and 
technology,  for  instance,  information  and  communication  technology.  It  can  provide  many 
improvements: files of judiciary cases no longer have to be constantly moving from place to 
place; less paper is needed (we can find better ways to use  physical space of Courts, not to 
mention its environmental effects); petitions, motions, judicial notifications and intimations can 
be  made  online  or  be  received  by  email  (with  the  use  of  electronic  signatures);  intelligent 
systems can give impulse to the procedure and, for instance, warn the parties about deadlines; 
hearings  can  be  video  recorded  (which  can  diminish  the  old  habit  of  Brazilian  judges  of 
reformulating  depositions  in  a  technical  language  -  that  is  neglecting  the  language  used  by 
witness or litigants - in order to save a written documented version of it) and preserved with 
regards of the language and the context it actually happened.  
Automation  in  judicial  procedures  if  well  used  can  be  a  good  instrument  for  reforms 
particularly in Brazil, since in this countries exchange of favors, economic advantages and very 
specifics forms of “Jeitinho”
23 are too often means to make the system work in favor of those 
who knows “its ways”. Automation strategies can diminish the power of judge assistants (who 
frequently are the ones  who decide which files are  going to  be  first  or last  in  the line and 
sometimes negotiate it in order to get advantages).  
                                                           
22Hans-Georg Gadamer,  O problema da consciência histórica, 1998.  
23João Mauricio Adeodato, Ética e retórica: para uma teoria da dogmática jurídica, 2006. 11 
The most important effect of the use of new communication technology is, probably, the 
increase of public access to procedures and the decisions. José Rodrigo Rodriguez wrote about a 
“struggle for justification” (between the ones who defend the restoration of formalist tradition 
and Brazilian readers of authors like Alexy and Dworkin) ongoing in Brazilian academic circles. 
Although  the  disputants  have  conflicted  views  on  the  issue,  they  share  the  claim  for  more 
impersonality, transparence and public access to decisions and the decision-making process
 24. 
Technology can help on the practical actualization of these claims.  
But we must be aware that the pressure for efficiency and rapidity can be excessive. Anxiety 
grows in modern societies, we want fast decisions. But we shouldn’t let our anxiety take the best 
of us. One should consider that sometimes the decision maker have to take his time to understand 
the peculiarities of a case. We should let them learn how to adapt to a concrete situation and not 
only to a system.  
Some issues recently raised about the need of oral procedures in Brazilian judicial process 
make an interesting example. Although there is not strong demands in Brazilian law literature 
against the request for oral procedures, law practitioners observe that judges are, more and more, 
foregoing the presence of litigants in Courts. A field research made at courts of Rio de Janeiro in 
2006
25 give us more accurate information on the issue. Bárbara Baptista interviewed attorneys 
and judges in Rio de Janeiro and observed the requirement oral procedures are perceived as 
negative by almost the totality of judges that were interviewed. The general opinion of judges is 
that oral procedures are an obstacle to the course of the procedures, that they are not useful and 
that there is no time for them. Baptista discusses the consequences of this kind of belief: 
encounters between judges and litigants are diminishing and they tend not to affect the decisions.  
Many factors are connected to the above described situation: strong demands for fast  
procedures and the way we learned to think of the decision making process in our time  (as 
something disconnected to ethics and to factual relations) are some of them.  This paper should 
be read as an invitation for deepen the discussion about those issues.      
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